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Abstract
The Mexican banking crisis of 1994]1995 has widely been interpreted as the victim of the
balance-of-payments crisis, rather than its cause. After all, Mexican banks had been enjoying
high capitalization ratios, deemed to be more than sufficient to deal with the increased risk
of non-performing loans. This paper, however, suggests that to a large extent Mexican
accounting practices } rather than sound principles } were responsible for the apparent
good health of the banking system. The role of banks in causing the Mexican crisis may
therefore have been greater than previously thought.
JEL classifications: F30; G21; O54; O16
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1. Introduction
In 1994]1995 Mexico went through its worst crisis since the Great Depression. A
speculative attack against the peso caused the exchange rate to devalue by more
than 50%; inflation and interest rates sky-rocketed; and the economy went into a
severe recession. At the same time, non-performing loans caused trouble in the
banking sector, and several banks had to be bailed out by the government.
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The causes of this crisis have been analyzed in detail. The standard explanation
Žhas pointed to the overvalued exchange rate as the main culprit Dornbusch and
.Werner, 1994; Krugman, 1995; OECD, 1995; Gil-Dıaz and Carstens, 1996 . The´
argument is not hard to follow. A continued positive inflation differential with the
United States, combined with a policy of keeping the exchange rate pegged to the
US dollar, led to an increasing overvaluation of the currency, causing lackluster
growth and a widening trade deficit. In those circumstances, the exchange rate
must sooner or later devalue, either through action taken by the Banco de Mexico,´
or forced by a speculative attack. This is what happened in December 1994; as the
peso came under attack and was brought down, interest rates and inflationary
expectations went up, causing default problems in the banking sector.
Other studies have complemented this view by emphasizing the role of self-
Žfulfilling expectations Krugman, 1995; Calvo and Mendoza, 1996; Cole and Kehoe,
.1996; Sachs et al., 1996 . As the volume of central bank reserves gradually dropped
below that of short-term debt during 1994, investors became less upbeat about
Mexico’s future. This shift in mood made them unwilling to further roll over the
debt, thus triggering the balance-of-payments crisis.
If the last word seems to have been said on this crisis, why the need for yet
another paper on the subject? Because, as will be argued, the role of the banking
system in contributing to the crisis has generally been underestimated. Notable
Ž .exceptions are Wilson et al. 2000 , who look at the effect of the devaluation on the
Ž .banks’ assets, and Calvo and Mendoza 1996 , who argue that expectations of a
future bailout of the banking sector may have set off the crisis. Nevertheless, there
has been a relative lack of interest in the role of Mexican banks in the 1994]1995
crisis. This may be due to the fact that on the surface, banks appeared to be in
good health. Although the volume of non-performing loans had been increasing,
the banking system’s capitalization ratio stood at a sturdy 9.81% in December
1994, well above the 8% set forth by the Basle recommendations. In that case, if
the banks ran into trouble, as they did, it must surely have been because of the
balance-of-payments crisis, rather than the other way around.
However, a closer look at the peculiarities of Mexican accounting rules suggests
that capitalization ratios may in reality have been much lower. For instance, it was
standard practice to classify as non-performing only that part of a loan which had
not been serviced on time, rather than the entire loan, as would be the case under
US or European accounting principles. It thus follows that the volume of non-per-
forming loans was grossly understated, causing observed capitalization ratios to be
upward biased. This paper therefore suggests that the banking system was in worse
health than at first appeared; its role in contributing to the crisis may thus have
been greater than previously thought.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 analyzes the
banking sector, using balance sheet data of individual banks; Section 3 takes a
closer look at Mexican accounting; Section 4 analyzes the relation between the
banking and the balance-of-payments crises; and Section 5 makes some concluding
remarks.
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2. Diagnosing the Mexican banking sector
The Mexican banking system was clearly deteriorating from 1992 onwards, as
reflected by the increasing volume of non-performing loans. This, however, did not
create particular cause for concern to the Banco de Mexico, since it believed the´
necessary regulatory measures had been taken to safeguard the viability of the
banking system. This view is reflected in reports of the Banco de Mexico:´
‘The existing frameworks for capitalization requirements, rating of credit portfolios,
and creation of pre¤enti¤e reser¤es ha¤e helped to lessen the risks stemming from the
Ž w xdeterioration of the ratio of non-performing loans’. Banco de Mexico 1994a , The´
.Mexican Economy 1994, pages 91]93
Guillermo Ortiz, at the time Minister of Finance, argued along the same lines:
‘ As a proportion of the total portfolio, non-performing loans ha¤e increased from
1.27% in 1988 to 7.54% in September 1993. Howe¤er, the loan-loss reser¤es as a
w xproportion of non-performing loans increased from 11 to 42% o¤er the same period .’
Ž .Ortiz, 1994, op. cit., page 209
After giving some background information on the liberalization of the banking
system, individual balance sheets will be analyzed in order to illustrate the banking
sector’s increased vulnerability.
2.1. The deregulation of the banking system1
The Mexican financial system was nationalized on 1 September 1982, during the
previous balance-of-payments crisis. At the same time, exchange and interest rate
controls were re-imposed. A first step to financial liberalization was taken in 1988
with the creation of banker’s acceptances, short-term letters of credit issued by
companies and guaranteed by commercial banks. It was the first time that interest
rates on money market instruments were allowed to be set freely. Moreover,
reserve requirements on banker’s acceptances were lowered to 30%. Further
progress was made in 1989 with the lifting of interest rate ceilings on all deposits
and securities held by banks and the elimination of mandatory credit allocation.
Cross-ownership restrictions, limiting the formation of financial groups, were eased
in 1989.
Financial liberalization was further completed by the privatization of commercial
banks, initiated by the approval of the Credit Institutions Law of June 1990.
Between June 1991 and July 1992, 18 banks were sold at extraordinarily high
average price-to-book ratios. The Credit Institutions Law also paved the way for a
universal banking system that for the first time allowed banks to provide mutual
fund management, foreign exchange dealing and warehousing of derivative instru-
ments. The financial conglomerates that emerged from the concentration of those
activities became known as grupos financieros. At the time of the crisis the banking
1 Ž . Ž .For an overview, see Aspe 1993 and Ortiz 1994 .
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system was composed of nine public development banks and 32 private banks.2
However, the domestic lending market was dominated by three banks which
accounted for nearly half of the assets of the consolidated banking system.3
Following the Basle recommendations, bank capital standards based on credit risk
were adopted between 1991 and 1993.
Overall, deregulation of the banking sector and of financial markets increased
capital inflows and gave banks easier access to credit, creating a rapid credit
expansion. Credit outstanding to the private sector increased in percentage of GDP
from 20% in 1989 to 55.3% in 1994.4 This credit was not always sound due to the
inexperience of the banking sector and excessive risk taking. As is well known,
implicit or explicit deposit insurance by the government may cause moral hazard,
whereby banks count on being bailed out when things go wrong, thus encouraging
Ž .them to invest in overly risky projects McKinnon and Pill, 1996 . Furthermore, the
Žhigh real interest rates created a problem of adverse selection Mishkin, 1990,
.1992 . Since successful firms had access to lower interest rates on the international
capital market, peso loans by Mexican banks were of an implicitly lower quality.
2.2. The increasing ¤ulnerability of the banking system
2.2.1. The main problem: non-performing loans
As can be seen from Fig. 1, the share of non-performing loans of the banking
system increased from a level close to 0% in 1990 to approximately 6% in the
beginning of 1994; it followed this upward trend during 1994, reaching 8% by
November 1994. Before concluding, however, that the banking crisis was mainly
due to non-performing loans, other potential loss sources must be analyzed more
closely.
All deposits, including the ones in the inter-banking market, were subject to
Ž .variable interest rates mostly indexed to the 4-week Cetes rate . The same was
true for assets. Loan rates were typically set by adding a specific premium to the
Ž .so-called Tasa de Interes Interbancario de Equilibrio TIIE . It was thus easy to´
ensure a positive spread, so that the trouble in the banking sector did not originate
from a time lag between the adjustment of loan and deposit rates. This is not to say
that there was no maturity mismatch. Though on the surface both loans and
deposits had short maturities, it was common for short-term loans to finance
long-term projects; there was thus an implicit understanding that those short-term
loans would be automatically rolled over, converting them in de facto long-term
loans. When the crisis } and the credit crunch } hit, banks became unable to
continue this practice, leading to a sharp increase in non-performing loans.
2 Publicly owned development banks provide priority financing to the export sector, local government
Ž .infrastructure projects and small- and medium-size enterprises OECD, 1995, op.cit., pages 27]28 .
3 Ž .These banks were Banamex, Bancomer and Serfin Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores, 1996 .´
4 Ž .OECD 1995 , op.cit., page 36, quoting figures from the Banco de Mxico.
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Fig. 1. Non-performing loans as a fraction of total loans.
It remains to be seen whether assets other than loans } bonds and stocks }
may have been responsible for the losses suffered by the banking system. In most
countries bonds have maturities of up to at least 10 years. The longer the maturity,
the more bond prices get negatively affected by rising interest rates. This drop in
market value of bonds must be reflected in the banks’ balance sheets. However, the
Mexican bond market was made up of money market discount bonds with a
maximum maturity of 1 year. Depreciations of bond positions denominated in
pesos were therefore hardly noticeable in 1994. Also stocks, which made up at most
10% of the banking system’s assets, did not cause any major upheaval. In the
period from December 1993 to December 1994 the stock market only fell by
8.68%, and recovered to its pre-crisis level by the end of 1995.
This leaves us with exchange rate risk as the last possible source of trouble.
Since the net foreign exchange position of Mexican banks was limited to 15% of
net capital, this was not directly a major issue. Nevertheless, the devaluation of the
peso did indirectly worsen the non-performing loan problem. Since many firms
were partly indebted in dollars, their situation degraded after the fall of the peso,
making it more difficult to service their loans, including those denominated in
pesos.
The banking sector’s troubles were therefore mainly due to non-performing
loans with other potential loss sources playing only a secondary role.
2.3. Non-performing loans: a disaggregated analysis
As shown by Fig. 1, the fraction of non-performing loans increased steadily since
the beginning of 1992. On a disaggregated level the picture looked even more
worrisome. By November 1994, approximately 10% of the banking system had a
5
Ž .Fig. 2. Non-performing loans as a fraction of total loans troubled banks and total banking system .
Ž . 5share of 10% or more of non-performing loans Fig. 2 . Banco Union, representing´
close to 2% of the banking system, even reached a level of 50% of non-performing
loans. In September 1994 the National Banking Commission intervened in Banco
Union and Banca Cremi because of fraudulent practices, and granted them´
financial support through the Bank Fund for the Protection of Savings
Ž .FOBAPROA . It is worth noting that Banco Union was insolvent, but the´
government preferred a bail-out to bankruptcy. In 1995 FOBAPROA intervened in
six more banks, including Banpaıs, Banco del Centro and Banco In¤erlat.´
Given the very different performance of individual banks, it is revealing to
contrast the loan portfolios of the troubled banks to those of the banking system as
a whole. By doing so, we get additional insights about what caused the crisis. In
comparison to the overall commercial banking system, the troubled banks had a
relatively bigger fraction of loans to the private sector than to households. Whereas
loans to the private sector and to households made up 54 and 42% of the
commercial banks’ loan portfolio in 1994]1995, for the troubled banks these
figures were 59 and 38%, respectively. Maybe more importantly, the troubled
banks saw a relatively greater increase in non-performing loans to the private
Ž .sector Figs. 3 and 4 .
5These banks were Bital, Banco Mercantil del Norte, Banco Union and Banca Cremi, which in terms´
of assets represented 8.81% of the total banking sector or 11.3% of the commercial banking sector in
November 1994.
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Ž .Fig. 3. Non-performing loans to households and private sector troubled banks .
The rise in non-performing loans to firms may thus have been at the basis of the
banking system’s increasing vulnerability. It should be noted that most of these
loans were short-term.6 The default on loans by firms may have been due to a
variety of reasons. First, business and bank failures tended to reinforce each other.
Second, as mentioned before, adverse selection left Mexican banks with bad credit,
since the better firms were able to tap the international credit market at cheaper
interest rates. Third, some Mexican bank directors were quite lavish in handing out
loans to companies they owned themselves.
This is not to say that households did not default on their debt. Actually, bad
loans to households were initially at an even higher level than non-performing
loans to businesses.7 However, the relative increase in bad loans to businesses was
more pronounced.8 Another interesting observation is that consumption loans }
which form part of loans to households } made up a bare 7% of the banking
system’s loan portfolio. The widely spread idea that credit card debt was at the
origin of the banking crisis should thus be tempered.
6 The particular type of loan is a short-term loan called ‘Credito en cuenta corriente’.´
7Note, however, that the bad loans problem to the households } especially in the case of housing
loans } may be underestimated because of Mexican accounting roles. We will return to this issue
subsequently.
8 Ž .This may be partly due to a government program to bail-out small debtors ADE . However, the
increase in bad loans to businesses occurred well before the ADE program was put in place in
September 1995.
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Ž .Fig. 4. Non-performing loans to households and private sector all commercial banks .
2.4. Loan-loss reser¤es and capitalization ratios
The figures on non-performing loans should be analyzed relative to the precau-
tionary measures } loan-loss reserves and capitalization ratios } taken by the
banks to insure themselves against the risks deriving from the possible default of
debtors. As mentioned before, although non-performing loans had clearly been
rising since 1992, it was widely thought that banks had taken sufficient measures to
deal adequately with the increased risk.
Before turning to the graphs, the role of loan-loss reserves and capitalization
ratios must be explained. When a bank takes on more risky loans, it is obliged to
increase its loan-loss reserves as a preventive measure in case the loans go awry. As
a complementary cautionary requirement the bank’s capitalization ratio } net
capital as a share of risky assets } is not supposed to fall below a certain
threshold.
Fig. 5 represents the loan-loss reserves as a fraction of non-performing loans. As
can be seen, their level remained fairly stable until August 1994 when the banking
crisis started in earnest. Fig. 6 gives an even rosier outlook: as the non-performing
loan problem steadily worsened from 1992 onwards, not only did the capitalization
ratio hold up pace, it actually increased to a healthy 9]10%, well above the 8%
Ž . 9officially recommended by Basle Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994 . Based on these
figures, the Mexican banking system seemed on the surface well prepared to deal
with the lingering debt default problem.
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Fig. 5. Loan-loss reserves as a fraction of non-performing loans.
3. Accounting for Mexican accounting
3.1. Peculiar features of Mexican accounting
Although Mexican banks seemed adequately insured against default risks, much
of the problem was hidden behind the peculiarities of Mexican accounting prac-
tices at the time. Since those were quite different from generally accepted account-
Ž .ing principles GAAP , comparing Mexican loan-loss reserves and capitalization
ratios to internationally accepted standards makes little sense. Before making an
attempt to correct for some of these differences, we give a brief overview of
Mexican accounting rules as they applied to the specific problem of non-perfor-
ming loans.
Mexican law required to classify as non-performing only that fraction of the loan
Ž .or of the interest payment which was due and had not been paid back, contrary to
international accounting practices, which oblige the total loan to be considered as
non-performing as soon as part of it has not been repaid.10 This meant that under
the Mexican system the volume of non-performing loans tended to appear with a
lag. This problem was particularly acute in the case of housing loans, with long
maturities of up to 30 years and with the payback of the principal typically
backlogged.
9 Note that the data in Fig. 6 go until March 1994. No further data are available for comparison, since
the data provided by the Banco de Mexico for the banking system only concern banks not affected by´
the government bailout.
10 Ž .Williams 1995 , op.cit., pages 7.03]7.12 and 20.03]20.08.
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Fig. 6. Capitalization ratios.
For other types of loans one would think this problem to have been less severe,
given the relatively short maturity of the banks’ loan portfolio.11 However, as
argued above, it was common in Mexico to roll over loans in case of inability to pay
back.12 By doing so, banks were able to mask the riskiness of those loans, and thus
limit reserve provisions.
Another problematic feature of the Mexican system was to be found in the risk
classification of loans, which was largely left up to the discretion of the individual
bank. Maybe surprisingly, this subjective categorization may have encouraged
banks to overstate the volume of non-performing loans by not writing off bad loans
fast enough. As in other countries, Mexican law requires non-performing loans to
be removed from the balance sheet as soon as the bank has a strong suspicion that
the debtor will be unable to comply in the future. Since writing off loans forces
banks to recapitalize, there existed a clear incentive to slow down this procedure.
All of the above practices tended to inflate capitalization ratios, relative to what
they would have been following international accounting standards. The first two
practices } considering as non-performing only that part of the loans which has
not been reimbursed and rolling over short-term loans } allowed banks to
dissimulate the true riskiness of their assets. By reducing the apparent volume of
risky loans, they artificially inflated capitalization ratios. Though the last practice
11 Ž .OECD 1995 , op.cit., page 37.
12 In case of inability to pay back, the bank could of course claim the collateral. However, due to a
lack of regulation, the same collateral was often used for different loans.
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Table 1
Ž .Capitalization ratio in function of assets being written off %
Ž . Ž .Assets to be written off % Capitalization ratio %
0 9.8
1 8.2
2 6.5
3 4.7
4 2.9
} not writing off loans fast enough } raised the volume of non-performing loans,
it had the same effect of increasing capitalization ratios. Indeed, if certain loans
Žhad been written off, the volume of risky assets the denominator of capitalization
. Ž .13ratios and preventive reserves the numerator of capitalization ratios would
have gone down by the same amount, thus reducing capitalization ratios; by not
writing off those loans, capitalization ratios therefore appeared higher than they
should have. A particular example of this possibility is worked out in the next
section. In the light of these accounting practices, it is obvious that the capitaliza-
tion ratios and the loan-loss reserves of Figs. 5 and 6 are hard to interpret.
3.2. A simple back-of-the-en¤elope correction
In this section we attempt to make a crude back-of-the-envelope calculation of
what the capitalization ratio would have been, had international accounting stan-
dards applied. In doing so, we focus on the specific problem of not writing off
certain assets. On the one hand, some of the non-performing loans should have
been removed from the balance sheets, but were not. On the other hand, some of
the loans classified as ‘good’ were in reality non-performing, and part of those
should also have been removed.
It is of course hard to know the share of assets to which this problem applied. In
the example given below it is somewhat arbitrarily assumed that 2% of all assets
Žshould have been written off under GAAP. In Table 1 we carry out the same
.exercise for different shares. As the baseline we take the economic figures of the
Mexican economy in December 1994:
Ž .Non]performing loans r total assets s 0.05 1
Ž .Capitalization ratio s capital r risky assets s 0.0981 2
Ž .Capital asset ratio s capital r total assets s 0.055 3
13 Ž .Loan-loss or preventive reserves are part of net capital, the numerator of the capitalization ratio.
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Ž . Ž .Combining Eqs. 2 and 3 , the capitalization ratio can easily be re-written as:
w x wŽ . x Ž .Capitalization ratio s 0.055 = total assets r 0.0981 = total assets 4
Writing off loans can be understood in two steps. First, the reserve provisions for
the loans are raised to 100%. This does not affect capital though, since higher
Ž .provisioning increases loan-loss reserves part of capital and decreases profits
Ž .also part of capital . Second, the actual writing off occurs by removing the loans
from the asset side and by withdrawing the preventive reserves from the liability
side. If 2% of all assets had been written off, both the numerator and the
Ž .denominator of the capitalization ratio in Eq. 4 would have decreased by
0.02 = total assets.14 This would have corresponded to a drop in the capitalization
ratio from 9.8 to 6.5%, an unacceptably low figure according to the Basle recom-
mendations.
As to be expected, the greater the share of assets being written off, the bigger
Ž .the effect on the capitalization ratio Table 1 . Though these calculations are far
from exact, they do suggest that changes in accounting practices may have a
significant effect on the capitalization ratio.
4. The interaction of the banking and the balance-of-payments crises
After having made clear that the banking system’s health was clearly deteriorat-
ing before the December 1994 peso devaluation, it is necessary to sketch a broader
picture of the Mexican economy in order to analyze the potential links between the
banking crisis and the balance-of-payments crisis. It will be claimed that the
balance-of-payments crisis developed parallel to the banking crisis, and that the
Banco de Mexico was limited in the defense of its exchange rate policy because of´
the vulnerable banking system. Furthermore, it will be suggested that the weak
banking system was partly responsible for the intensity of the economic crisis.
4.1. The situation before December 1994
Real interest rates rose following financial liberalization, but later started falling
from approximately 7% in March 1993 to 3% in February 1994. Nominal interest
Ž .rates Cetes 28-day rate came down from 19.39% in October 1992 to 9.45% in
February 1994. Inflation measured by the CPI was brought under control reaching
single digits for the first time in 1993 and further decreasing to 6.7% in September
1994. Compared to international figures nominal and real interest rates were
Ž .therefore not high in the beginning of 1994 OECD, 1995 . Consequently, the
14 Ž .This calculation is approximate, since the denominator risky assets is in reality a relatively
Ž .complex weighted sum of assets where the weight increases with risk .
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growing problem of non-performing loans was initially not caused by rising interest
rates.
As often occurs in financial crises, the use of the currency as a nominal anchor
steadily appreciated the real value of the Mexican peso. This eroded Mexico’s
international competitiveness, as reflected by its widening current account deficit,
which reached 8% of GDP in 1994. Partly due to the misalignment of the exchange
rate, growth remained unsatisfactorily low with an average of 3% between 1990
and 1994.
The substantial current account deficit was also related to low domestic savings
and important foreign capital inflows. Financial deregulation did not generate
additional private savings. Although total savings remained stable at a level of
approximately 22]25% of GDP, its composition changed: private savings went
down, but were compensated by strong public sector savings until the beginning of
1994. Because of Mexico’s success in getting inflation down, important capital
Ž .inflows almost two-thirds of which was portfolio investment were attracted
between 1991 and March 1994. The policy of complete sterilization of capital
inflows by the Banco de Mexico prevented a huge increase in the money supply.´
Base money grew at a constant rate which slightly increased during 1994. The
sterilization policy contributed to keeping inflationary expectations down.
4.2. The buildup of the balance-of-payments and the banking crisis
The situation worsened in March 1994 with the assassination of presidential
candidate Colosio followed by a first speculative attack against the peso. Nominal
and real interest rates rose sharply in the short term to later stabilize at a level of
approximately 5% points higher than in the beginning of 1994. At this point, the
balance-of-payments crisis and the banking crisis became virtually unavoidable.
Two policy options were now open to the Banco de Mexico. First, if interest rates´
were allowed to rise to protect the exchange rate, the financial system would be
further weakened because of an increase in non-performing loans, making a fiscal
bail-out more likely. As will be explained, a rise in interest rates causes an
increased amortization of loans, putting pressure on debtors and thus adding to the
already high pool of non-performing loans. Second, if the government tried to keep
interest rates in check in order to save the banking system, it would further fuel
Ž .bad credit to the private sector. The low interest rates would weaken the position
of the peso, increasing the probability of a speculative attack against the currency
and making the sustainability of the exchange rate regime more difficult. Aware of
the problems of the banking sector, the Banco de Mexico chose for the second´
option.15 Through its policy of sterilization the Mexican central bank limited the
increase of interest rates, though they did rise somewhat because of higher US
interest rates and an increased probability of devaluation.
15 Ž . Ž . Ž .See Banco de Mexico 1994b , Report on Monetary Policy May 1994 and OECD 1995 , op.cit.,´
page 38.
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In spite of the only limited rise in interest rates, the situation of the banking
system worsened further and the government intervened to bail out two banks in
September 1994. In November 1994 the outstanding amount of Tesobonos, a
short-term bond indexed to the dollar, exceeded the dollar reserves of the Banco
de Mexico. The impossibility to refinance triggered the balance-of-payments crisis´
in December 1994. Intervention efforts could not be kept up to defend a specula-
tive attack against the peso on 21 December, and the peso was allowed to float.
The high probability of default by the Mexican government on Tesobonos sent
interest rates upward. The Cetes rate reached 74.75% in April 1995, whereas real
interest rates rose to 45.35%. Inflation grew steadily, reaching 52%ryear in
December 1995. This partly reflected the government’s need to generate inflation
revenues in order to compensate for interest rate payments on foregone foreign
reserves.
The role of the banking system in the balance-of-payments crisis may be
summarized in the following way. The vulnerability of the banks, which had been
built up over several years, made a balance-of-payments and banking crisis virtually
unavoidable. In order to protect the banking system, the Banco de Mexico chose´
not to raise interest rates too much, thus making a balance-of-payments crisis
highly probable. The alternative of defending the peso in a more aggressive way by
raising interest rates would merely have worsened the banking problems. This
would have fueled inflationary expectations because of an increased probability of
a government bailout of the banking system, thus precipitating a balance-of-pay-
ments crisis. A stronger banking sector would have allowed the Banco de Mexico to´
defend the currency. This is not to say that rising interest rates would have been a
credible policy to sustain the peso and avoid the December 1994 crisis, but it
remains true that this policy option was simply not available. Furthermore, higher
interest rates might at least have limited the devaluation of the peso.
4.3. The rise in interest rates worsened the banking crisis
The devaluation of the peso in December 1994 created a significant increase in
the volume of non-performing loans. Since part of the loans were denominated in
foreign currency, the drop of the peso clearly increased their default risk. Further-
more, the devaluation raised both nominal and real interest rates, reflecting higher
inflationary expectations and a higher perceived risk of further devaluations. The
increase in the real interest rates led to a higher default risk on variable interest
Ž . 16loans and on rolled-over fixed interest loans , since firms’ profits presumably did
not grow at the same rate as their refinancing costs.
But also the rise in nominal interest rates increased the default risk, because of a
reduction in the duration of loans. Intuitively, it is easy to understand that when
inflation and nominal interest rates go up, the initial interest payments become
more important and the final principal payment less important. In other words, an
16As argued before, short-term fixed interest loans which are rolled over can be thought of as de
facto.
14
increase in nominal interest rates obliges the debtor to amortize his loan faster.
This is equivalent to the duration of the loan decreasing. Duration is therefore
different from maturity, and may be considered a measure of the average life of a
Ž .debt instrument on a present value basis Hopewell and Kaufman, 1973 . The
effect of rising interest rates on the duration of debt contracts is illustrated in Box
1.
The balance-of-payments crisis therefore worsened the banking crisis not only
because of rising real interest rates, but also because of increasing nominal interest
rates. This problem was partially dealt with by restructuring loans in Unidades de
( )In¤ersion UDIs , a unit of account with constant real value. This restructuring´
program changed variable interest loans into fixed-rate indexed loans, thus taking
off pressure to pay back the loan at an increased rate.
Box 1. The duration of loans
Duration of debt contract: The Macaulay duration measure of a debt contract may
Ž .be considered as the average life time in years of the debt instrument on a
present value basis. The Macaulay duration formula is given by:
Ž .C ttnÝts1 tŽ .1 q R
CtnÝts1 tŽ .1 q R
where
v C s interest or principal payment;
Ž .v t s length of time to the interest or principal payment;
v n s length of time to maturity; and
v R s yield-to-maturity.
The Macaulay-duration is always shorter than the maturity of the loan except for
zero-coupon loans where they are equal.
Shortening of duration and rising nominal interest rates:
Rising nominal interest rates because of increasing inflation forces debtors to
amortize their loan faster in real terms. This increased weight of real payments at
the beginning of the debt contract is reflected in a reduced duration. An example
Ž .will illustrate this phenomenon Fig. 7 . Consider a 20-year housing loan with the
Ž .following conditions: quarterly interest payments CPP rate q 5% annually and
quarterly repayment of principal in a flat fashion. The interest payment and the
yield of the loan are supposed to be the same. Stationary expectations are assumed,
so that expected future interest rates are the same as present interest rates. When
nominal interest rates go up as during 1994, duration reduces.
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Fig. 7. Duration of a 20-year housing loan.
4.4. The worsening of the banking crisis increased interest rates
Not only did rising interest rates deepen the banking crisis, the worsening crisis
also raised interest rates further because of the bailout of the banking system. A
loan restructuring plan and a special program designed to help small debtors had
an additional negative effect on the fiscal deficit, thus causing higher expected
inflation and nominal interest rates. Also real interest continued to increase
because of the perceived currency risk.
We were thus in the presence of a self-reinforcing mechanism, where the
worsening banking crisis led to rising interest rates, and where rising interest rates
led to a further worsening of the banking crisis. Had the banking system been
healthier to start with, this self-reinforcing process would have been weaker, thus
causing less damage to the economy.
5. Concluding remarks
In spite of apparently high capitalization ratios, this paper argues that the health
of Mexican banks had been worsening since 1992. Not only did the volume of
non-performing loans steadily increase, capitalization ratios were probably substan-
tially lower than the numbers revealed. Indeed, the seemingly satisfactory capital-
ization ratios had much to do with the peculiarities of the Mexican accounting
system. Unlike the emphasis of most economists on the overvalued exchange rate,
this paper therefore suggests that the banking sector is crucial in understanding the
Mexican crisis of 1994]1995. It also shows the importance of analyzing country-
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specific accounting practices, before simply comparing certain numbers to interna-
tionally accepted standards. As a final note, it is worth mentioning that Mexico is
currently adjusting its accounting system to GAAP.
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